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and cities were under some sort of stay-at-home order, which affected approximately 94 percent
of the population. 4
This memorandum examines whether Covid-19 impacts a nonresidential debtor’s duties
to comply with its lease obligations. Part I of this memorandum discusses the debtor’s
obligations post-petition to comply with its duties to pay rent. Specifically, the debtor’s
obligations under section 365(d)(3) and section 503(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Part II of this
memorandum discusses how force majeure might excuse a debtor from paying rent. Lastly, Part
III discusses the common law remedies that can be argued along with a force majeure clause.
Discussion
I.

Bankruptcy Code Requires Debtor to Fulfill Obligations of a Nonresidential Lease
“Section 365(d)(3) requires a debtor-in-possession to timely perform all the obligations

of the debtor.” 5 The legislative history emulates the congressional concern that lessors of
nonresidential property have been frequently forced to extend credit to an estate during the time
period for assumption or rejection of the lease. 6 Generally, courts are in agreement that section
365(d)(3) requires Chapter 11 debtors to continue performance until the lease is assumed or
rejected. 7 To determine whether an obligation arises from or after the order for relief, under
section 365(d)(3), the first step is to look at the terms of the lease. 8 For example, in In re Hitz,
the lease agreement provided for a “minimum base rent schedule,” which was due on the first of
each. 9 Consequently, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition on February 24, 2020, which resulted

See id. at 32–33 (affecting 308 million people).
In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. at 376.
6
See id; see also 130 Cong. Rec. S8894-95 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) reprinted in App. 4
Collier on Bankruptcy, at XX-70 - XX-71 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992).
7
See In re Burival, 406 B.R. 548, 551–52 (8th Cir. BAP 2009); see also Adelphia Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. Abnos, 483
F.3d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Racing Servs., Inc., 340 B.R. 73 (8th Cir. BAP 2006).
8
In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. at 376.
9
See id .
4
5
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in the February 2020 rent payment being a pre-petition obligation and the March 2020 rent being
a post-petition obligation. 10 Some courts view the language of section 365(d)(3) “as clear and
there job of applying the language as straightforward: any obligation of a debtor under a lease
which becomes due after the entry of the order for relief under the Bankruptcy Code and before
the lease is assumed or rejected must be paid or otherwise fulfilled when due.” 11 Additionally,
this view has created a bright-line test, which states if a rent payment is due during the postpetition period it must be paid pursuant to section 365(d)(3). 12 Other courts interpret section
365(d)(3) as ambiguous and prorate rent payments into pre-petition and post-petition
components and hold that section 365(d)(3) only requires payment of the post-petition
component. 13 This ambiguity is caused by the lack of a definition for the term obligation in the
Bankruptcy Code. 14
II.

Force Majeure Excuses Debtor’s Post-Petition Rent Obligations
“A force majeure clause is a contractual clause that excuses performance of contractual

obligations–either wholly or for the duration of the force majeure–upon the occurrence of a
covered event in which is beyond the control of either party to the contract.” 15 “Force majeure is
a phrase coined primarily for the convenience of contracting parties wishing to describe the facts
that create a contractual impossibility due to an act of god.” 16 Force Majeure provisions can be
triggered by various circumstances, such as natural disasters, acts of god, civil unrest,

10

See id.
See In re Burival, 406 B.R. at 552.
12
See id.
13
See id; see also Heathcon Holdings, LLC v. Dunn Indus., LLC (In re Dunn Indus., LLC), 320 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr.
D. Md. 2005) (“Obligations can be read to arise when billed or when accrued.”).
14
See Heathcon Holdings, LLC., 320 B.R. at 90.
15
See In re Cec Entm’t, Inc., 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3493, at *16 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
16
See id.
11
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governmental actions or orders and several other unforeseen events. 17 An act of government is
one of the commonly listed force majeure events, which turns on whether the government act
was the actual cause of the disruption to performance, and whether the disruption met the
contractual threshold. 18 Courts turn to state law to determine if an event triggers a force majeure
clause in a lease because it’s a matter of contractual law. 19 When analyzing force majeure
clauses courts looks to several elements, such as “(1) whether the event qualifies as force
majeure under the contract, (2) whether the risk of nonperformance was foreseeable and able to
be mitigated, and (3) whether performance is truly impossible.” 20
In Illinois, for example, contracts are enforced according to their terms and a force
majeure clause will only excuse contract performance if the event cited by the nonperforming
party was the proximate cause of that party’s nonperformance. 21 In In re Hitz, Governor
Pritzker’s executive Covid-19 stay-at-home order unambiguously triggered the force majeure
clause in the restaurant lease for three reasons. 22 First, the governor’s order unquestionably
constituted both a governmental action and an order contemplated by the language of the
clause. 23 Second, the order hindered the debtor’s ability to perform because the debtor was

See Perrie Weiner, The Progression of Covid-19 Force Majeure Litigation, LAW360 LEXIS 1 (Aug. 28, 2020)
https://plus.lexis.com/document?pdworkfolderid=82f1d998-a46f-495e-868a941e822c9723&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalyticalmaterials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A60PM-1K71-JJSF-227M-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=122100&pdisurlapi=true&cbc=0&pdmfid=1530671&crid=5fbfa74c-ceba-4124-a89907a77e5d5005#.
18
See J. Hunter Robinson et al., Article: Use the Force? Understanding Force Majeure Clauses, 44 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 1, 15 (2020).
19
See In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. at 377.
20
See Alan M. DiSciullo, Feature the Covid-19 Issue the Effect of Covid-19 on Lease Negotiations, 35 PROBATE &
PROPERTY 46, 47 (2021).
21
See In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. at 377.
22
See id.
23
See id. (“Landlord and Tenant shall each be excused from performing its obligations or undertakings provided in
this Lease, in the event, but only so long as the performance of any of its obligations are prevented or delayed,
retarded or hindered by. . . laws, governmental action or inaction, orders of government. . . . Lack of money shall not
be grounds for Force Majeure.”).
17
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prohibited from offering on premises consumption of food and beverages. 24 Third, the order was
the proximate cause of the debtor’s inability to pay rent because the debtor was prevented from
operating normally and was restricted to only providing take-out, curbside pick-up, and
delivery. 25 The Illinois court found, therefore, that the debtor was excused from paying 75
percent of the rent, but had to pay 25 percent of the rent, for the kitchen space used for take-out
and delivery. 26
Additionally, in In re Cinemax USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., the force majeure clause
excused all payment of rent during the closure, but based on the plain language of the lease,
added time on to the end of the lease term based on such closure. 27 Therefore, the court in this
case held the tenant was excused from paying rent until they were allowed to reopen, but the
tenant will have to pay the rent on the back end of the lease according to the lease provision. 28
The tenant argued they should only have to pay fifty percent of the rent since they are only
allowed to reopen at limited capacity. 29 In support of their argument, the tenant cited to In re
Hitz, which held the debtor was only allowed to offer takeout and delivery services and the
debtor was required to pay rent proportional to the limited services. 30 However, the Cinemax
USA lease differed from In re Hitz, because the force majeure clause here, states rent will be
excused during the closure and will add on time to the end of the lease. 31

See In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. at 377.
See id. at 377–78 (explaining “(1) an unexpected intervening event occurred, (2) the parties' agreement assumed
such an event would not occur, and (3) the unexpected event made contractual performance impossible or
impracticable”).
26
See id. at 378–80.
27
See In re Cinemax USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 200, at *17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021).
28
See id. at 16.
29
See id. at 17.
30
See id.
31
See id.
24
25
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In Palm Springs Mile Associations, however, the debtor was not excused from paying
rent under the force majeure clause. 32 The debtor asserted that the Florida restrictions on
business operations and non-essential activities qualifies as force majeure events and their
obligations to pay rent should automatically be suspended. 33 The Florida court, however, found
that the debtor failed to explain how the governmental regulations resulted in its inability to pay
its rent. 34 Instead, the debtor argued that the force majeure clause does not require any showing
that the county’s regulations are linked to its nonpayment of rent, which fails to identify the
debtors inability to pay rent. 35 Further, the court noted that force majeure clauses are narrowly
construed and will generally only excuse nonperformance if the event that caused the
nonperformance is specifically identified. 36
III.

Common Law Remedies in Real Estate Agreements
Several common law remedies, including frustration of purpose, impracticability, and

impossibility, can be argued along with the contractual theory of force majeure. 37 The doctrine of
frustration of purpose focuses on “whether the event at issue has obviated the purpose of the
contract, rather than whether it has made a party’s contractual performance unviable.” 38 “The
prima facie case requires that (1) an event substantially frustrating a party's principal purpose, (2)
the nonoccurrence of the event was a basic assumption of the contract, and (3) the event was not
the fault of the party asserting the defense.” 39 The doctrines of impracticability and impossibility
excuse performance when a party establishes “(1) an unexpected intervening event occurred, (2)

See Palm Springs Mile Assocs. v. Kirkland’s Stores, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 163880, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
See id. at 5.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id. at 4.
37
See DiSciullo, supra note 20 at 48.
38
See DiSciullo, supra note 20 at 49.
39
See DiSciullo, supra note 20 at 49.
32
33
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the parties' agreement assumed such an event would not occur, and (3) the unexpected event
made contractual performance impossible or impracticable.” 40 However, a party’s
nonperformance will not be excused if the event preventing performance was expected or was
foreseeable at the time of the contract’s execution. 41
For example, In re Cinemax USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., the court held the debtor
was not excused under the doctrine of frustration of purpose, even though the Covid-19
pandemic was completely unforeseeable because once the theatre was allowed to reopen, they
chose not to. 42 The debtor argued reopening would result in negative operating income because
of the 50 percent capacity limit and the increased costs of providing appropriate personal
protective equipment and enforcement of social distancing guidelines. 43 The court acknowledged
that the debtor’s concerns were reasonable, but the concerns are one of timing, not ability. 44
Further, the court reasoned like the debtors here, many businesses have had to deal with the same
reopening concerns during the pandemic and figured out how to address these concerns. 45
Therefore, the debtor was not excused because they chose not to reopen due to economic
concerns. 46 Similarly, in In re Cec Entm’t, Inc., the debtor was not entitled to a reduction or
abatement of its rent obligations under the doctrine of frustration of purpose nor force majeure
because the debtor’s “decision to prioritize its own long term business interests over near term
profits, does not totally destroy the value of the lease.” 47 Also, even though the government
regulations limited the debtor’s ability to operate its primary business, the lease allowed the

See DiSciullo, supra note 20 at 49.
See DiSciullo, supra note 20 at 49.
42
See In re Cinemax USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 200, at *14.
43
See id. at *12.
44
See id. at *14.
45
See id.
46
See id.
47
See In re Cec Entm’t, Inc., 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3493, at *47.
40
41
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debtors to operate any number of different businesses on the premises. 48 Thus, the operation of
the current venue, a Chuck E. Cheese venue, was not the parties’ primary purpose when entering
the lease and the government regulations do not prevent the debtor from using the premises in
accordance with the lease. 49
Conclusion
Covid-19 has forced many businesses into bankruptcy this past year and will likely
continue having a negative impact on businesses. Debtors, however, will be able to seek contract
remedies, such as force majeure clauses and several common law remedies. Since force majeure
clauses are contractual clauses, courts will turn to state law to determine whether an event
triggered a force majeure clause. Several courts this past year have excused all or partial rent
payment due to Covid-19 and government stay-at-home orders triggering force majeure clauses
after analyzing the debtor’s obligations under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

48
49

See id. at *45–46.
See id.
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